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Determining how to change and evaluate the performance of
political institutions, rules, and constitutions requires a theoretical
conception of what performance is and how it can be measured.  But
political performance has many different aspects: economic
performance, delivery of social welfare, citizen satisfaction, durability,
etc.  The initial problem we face, then, is the selection of basic
performance criteria that can be tied into a coherent and justifiable
whole.  Only after the selection of such criteria does it make sense to
move on to the tasks of performance measurement, institutional
evaluation, and proposals for constitutional change.  In this Essay, we
explore the difficulties of constructing such a metric, propose a
relatively simple solution, and develop some early indications of how
the metric might be operationalized.
Our starting point grows out of the theories of democracy,
political economy, social choice, and distributive justice.  In these
fields, the welfare of the members of a society (in the aggregate
referred to as “social welfare”) has a primary position in the evaluation
of that society’s performance.  The empirical motivation for this
project was a simple and uncomfortable observation: although the
established developed liberal democracies do not vary enormously in
the rights they afford citizens, their per capita incomes, or their long-
term economic growth rates, they do vary considerably in the physical,
social, and economic safety they afford their citizens.  This is partially
reflected in the diversity of income and wealth distributions within
their populations, their vastly differing incarceration and murder
rates, their varying life expectancies, etc.  These considerable
differences in how democracies treat their citizens (especially their
needy citizens) are a basic marker of their delivery of aggregate social
welfare.  From that perspective, social welfare is linked to social justice
via the central role played by the satisfaction of basic needs.  Hence,
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by focusing on needs, this Essay touches upon some of the normative
and theoretical chestnuts in the literature of social justice and social
welfare and develops implications for constitutional evaluation and
institutional reform proposals.
Our tactic is to build on the notions of Harsanyi1 and Rawls,2
both of whom argue that social justice must be understood through a
lens of impartial reasoning.  This leads one to regard citizens’ rights
and economic welfare as of foremost concern.  Our own empirical
work on impartial reasoning and social justice led to a focus on a
sustainable minimum or floor.3  Gillian Brock has recently
reinterpreted this in terms of needs.4  We follow her lead.  By focusing
on needs as a foundational aspect of social welfare, we will argue
(along with Braybrooke)5 that two of the biggest conundrums of the
social choice literature can be partially avoided: one need not have
direct interpersonal comparability of individuals’ welfare writ large,
nor does one need to directly confront Arrow’s famous impossibility
result.6
If fulfilling basic needs is an important consequential implication
of the normative justification for democracy, then needs satisfaction
can be used as a foundational criterion for evaluating the
performance of liberal democratic institutions and regimes.  Such a
move justifies a scale of basic need satisfaction as a metric for
1. John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-Taking,
61 J. POL. ECON. 434, 434–35 (1953) (noting that analysis of satisfaction in welfare
economics requires an analysis of choice under conditions of risk and incomplete
information).
2. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 14–19 (Harvard Univ. Press 1999)
(1971) (discussing a theory of justice based upon concepts of rational decision making at
an abstract level).
3. NORMAN FROHLICH & JOE A. OPPENHEIMER, CHOOSING JUSTICE: AN EXPERIMENTAL
APPROACH TO ETHICAL THEORY 35 (1992) (arguing that the most just distribution of income
is that which individuals actually select under conditions of impartiality: i.e., where
individuals set a floor constraint and then allow for maximization of income) [hereinafter
CHOOSING JUSTICE: AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO ETHICAL THEORY]; see also Norman
Frohlich & Joe A. Oppenheimer, Choosing Justice in Experimental Democracies with Production,
84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 461 (1990) (discussing the outcome of various experiments that
analyze the floor constraint principle in an attempt to identify a sustainable floor)
[hereinafter Choosing Justice in Experimental Democracies with Production].
4. Gillian Brock, Needs and Global Justice, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF NEED 51, 51 (Soran
Reader ed., 2005) (arguing that “needs are tremendously salient in developing any
plausible account of global justice”).
5. See generally DAVID BRAYBROOKE, MEETING NEEDS (1987) (articulating a theory of
justice and evaluation of social institutions using the concept of basic needs).
6. See Kenneth J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. POL. ECON. 328
(1950) (demonstrating the impossibility of a single global societal preference order
reflecting the actual aggregate preferences of individual members of the society).
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evaluating democratic systems, at least among equally economically
developed democratic states.  Preliminary examination reveals
considerable variability in need satisfaction among the world’s
developed democracies.  This indicates differences in the normative
performance of different states and gives a basis for examining the
positive links between proposals for constitutional changes and the
design of democratic systems.
I. JUSTIFYING DEMOCRACY
In a democracy, the community’s political decisions are made by
the people living in the state (or the relatively large subset of the adult
population constituting its citizenry), or their elected representatives,
via some voting procedures.  A community’s choice is deemed to re-
present what is good for the community.  That communal good is de-
cided by (or in a republican or indirect democracy, it is seriously
informed by) the decentralized choices of the individuals within the
community.  For this method of decision making to make sense, the
democratic decisions must be based on matters that can be potentially
knowable by the voter.  This bespeaks of an implicit epistemology regard-
ing the “Good”:7 no one, in general, is in a better position than the
individual voter to gain direct knowledge of what is good (at least for
herself) based on observation, discussion, consultation, and inward re-
flection.8  This is not to say that the individual necessarily has full
knowledge of what is good for herself.  Rather, it assumes that it is
better for the individual to exercise her judgment regarding what is
best for herself because, in general, she can have better knowledge than
anyone else about her own welfare.  One function of democratic
processes is to aggregate these individual judgments.
In legitimating these judgments, liberal democracy reinforces the
normative assumption that the welfare of individuals constitutes a ma-
jor component of the societal Good.  If the Good is knowable at all in
a democracy, it is the individual’s right to seek it for herself or to
delegate the authority to recognize it to someone whom she reasona-
bly believes has better tools to determine it (a doctor, a politician,
7. Eduardo Frajman, Norman Frohlich & Joe A. Oppenheimer, Why and How Democra-
cies Limit Pluralism, Paper Presented at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Soci-
ety in Nashville, TN (Mar. 21–23, 2003), http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/oppenheimer/
pluralism.pdf (defining “the Good” as the welfare of the citizen as interpreted by that very
citizen, and examining the role of this notion of the Good as the foundational justification
of modern liberal democracy).
8. FREDERICK A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 110 (1960) (noting that indi-
viduals’ information about their own welfare is distributed and decentralized as a matter of
principle).
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etc.).  Implicitly, the welfare of each individual is given equal moral
status.
Individual welfare is assumed to be directly reflected in each
voter’s considered choices.  The democratic creed as applied to repre-
sentative government thus deems the social Good to be more or less
an equal function of each citizen’s (voting) decisions and the resul-
tant decisions of her elected representatives.  It is a function of each
citizen’s estimation of what is good for her, or, if she wishes, her esti-
mation of what is good for society.  The justificatory structure of de-
mocracy is built upon these presumptions.  That votes are cast on a
one-person-one-vote basis implies a moral presumption regarding the
equal status of individual welfare in the collective objectives of the
society.  By legitimating the vote, the state empowers the individual.9
But this leaves out the crucial and difficult problem of aggrega-
tion.  If it evokes the search for the holy grail—a characterization of
social welfare in terms of a social welfare function—it leaves out the
precise form as well as the question of its achievability.
A. The Problem of a Social Welfare Metric
The possibility and impossibility of a social welfare function has
been the subject of a celebrated mountain of scholarship that we need
not review here.  But we shall bring in some threads of that discussion
to place our contribution in perspective.  Traditionally, and in our ar-
gument, the welfare of the collective (the social welfare) is seen as
determined by the welfare of the citizens of the society.  More pre-
cisely, we might say that social welfare (W) is determined by, or per-
haps a function of, the welfare of the individuals (wi) that make up the
society, or W = f(w1, . . . , wn).
1. Constraints
Before continuing, it is important to note the constraints that
must be placed on any W for it to make sense as an indicator of the
quality of democratic performance.  The premises of democracy in-
clude the equality of the individual’s weight in the collective judgment
of the actions of government, and in the protections given from and
by government to individual rights.  These act as basic constraints to
9. This is a bit of an overstatement.  Obviously, the empowerment is limited by the
structure of the agenda and the resources made available beyond the vote in order to
persuade, cajole, etc. others.  And if there is considerable asymmetry in the holdings of
resources for communication, it may well be that individuals are given neither sufficient
information to know their real welfare interests nor sufficient resources to protect these
interests.
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any conception of evaluating the performance of democratic govern-
ments.10  Let us explore these constraints a bit further.
To justify government by welfare, given the lessons of the logic of
collective action literature, implies that people must have basic civil
liberties.  Otherwise, the demand for many valued public goods will
neither be manifest nor factored into public decision making.  Often,
groups will not even know that there are common interests without
the possibility of free communication.  Indeed, this has been made
apparent by how the Internet’s low communication costs have led to
greater awareness of the shared interests of such groups as gays and
lesbians and other previously oppressed individuals.  For groups to
demonstrate the scale of their demands socially and politically, they
must be capable of sharing the costs of the political efforts to change
the public policies underlying their demands for public goods without
undue costs being imposed upon them because of their identity.
In other words, for groups of people to meet their needs over
time, they must have the freedom to organize themselves politically.
If nothing else, this gives a solid justification for liberal political or-
ders.  Of course, there is no “ought” derived without a normative pre-
sumption.  In this case, the normative presumption, which we argue is
inherent in the justification of democracy, is that it is a good thing for
people to get their shared needs met.  If we subscribe to such values
(and most do) then it follows that people ought to have these free-
doms.  Without such freedoms, even the identity of the shared inter-
ests will often remain unknown.  This proactive justification for
liberties goes beyond a more traditional justification, which turns on
the need for “negative” protections from governmental intrusion.11
And, of course, there are other notions of performance that must
be considered side-constraints, including stability and a state’s ability
to defend itself in the face of threats.
2. Considerations of a Metric
It is counter-productive to focus only on these side constraints:
one man, one vote, and basic liberties for individuals and groups.  Any
10. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 26–35 (1974) (positing that because
individuals’ rights must be considered inviolable, they are to be constraints on the state’s
policies to achieve any ends).
11. A nice way to conceive of the traditional view of any bill of rights is that it is the
guarantee of a minimum level of protection against encroachments upon individual rights
that citizens know cannot be removed even if they are among the “losers” in the political
game.  The emphasis we place goes beyond this to note that the guarantees are, impor-
tantly, also extended to individuals as groups.
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such formulation leaves out the content of welfare and hence does
not tell us what we demand of such a metric.  Clearly, we will want to
be able to make some judgments of form and content when we con-
clude that one system performs better than another (asserting that W1
> W2).  In other words, we are interested in comparing the political
performance of societies with one another.  But when we ask what
properties we might expect of this scale, we might begin by noting
that completeness is certainly beyond us.  We do not claim that all politi-
cal systems, or even all democratic political systems, can be compared
with one another using the same scale: the performance criteria for a
developing democracy (e.g., India) might be quite different from
those of a developed one such as Norway.  Extraordinary differences
in economic circumstances, security situations, ethnic rivalries, and so
on may require a fundamentally different weighting of the constraints
to the other elements of social welfare, or W.  This will leave our com-
parisons to be solely between developed democracies, all of whom, we
shall point out, share a number of major characteristics.
Abandoning completeness, however, does not eradicate all sub-
stantial normative tools.  Sen argued that in considering how to judge
and evaluate a metric for social welfare we might begin by analyzing
the concept of best, or maximal, in terms of the properties that we
want from such a metric.12  He proposed two properties (a and b),
and then analyzed the two to arrive at some conclusions regarding
what is “best.”13  He argues that perhaps a common language notion
of “best” requires both these properties, and proved that together they
imply a full ordering.14  We have already abandoned completeness in
the universal set of concern.  To understand what is left, let us con-
sider Sen’s properties.
Alpha is the notion that if something (X) is best among a set of
items, if we then restrict our purview to a smaller subset of the items,
and if X is in that subset, it must be best in that subset also.  Note that
this works for all naturally ordered relations such as “higher than”
(e.g., McKinley is the highest mountain in North America, thus it is
12. See AMARTYA K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 1–20 (1970) (analyz-
ing what properties we might demand of systems of collective choice and how this relates
to our notions of best).
13. Id. at 17.
14. Id. A full ordering can be illustrated by a relationship such as “at least as hot as.”  It
implies transitivity (if a is at least as hot as b and b is at least as hot as c, then c is at least as
hot as a); it implies reflexivity (a is at least as hot as itself); and it implies completeness in that
all objects can be compared with regard to this relation (a is at least as hot as b or b is at
least as hot as a).
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the highest mountain in Alaska).  Such a property may seem quite
basic to any notion of best.
Beta has a similar feel: say two options, X and Y, are tied for best
in a subset of available options, and one is best in the universal set. If
so, they ought to be tied for best in the universal set.  Again, this also
works for all naturally ordered relations such as “higher than.”  For
example, say X and Y are tied as the hardest metal.  Then if we con-
sider a larger set, say woods and metals, if X is the hardest substance
considered in the larger set, then Y is still tied with X.
Considering the properties in such an abstract fashion permits us
to identify when they might be suspect: when the quality of “best” is a
function of the environment within which the selection is made, we
might question the two properties. X might be the best in the world
because of the varied environments of the world.  But restricting the
environments to those of a subset, even were it to include X, may allow
Y to excel in the subset where the items that detract from Y’s perform-
ance do not show up.  In such a case, Y could be best in the subset.
And X, though best in the wider mix of environs, does not show up as
well as Y in the restricted set, hence violating Alpha.  Similarly, if X
and Y are tied in a subset, it could be that one of them thrives better
in the more inclusive or varied environment, hence violating Beta.
The question, then, is the relevance of these properties for com-
paring democratic system performance across societies in terms of a
metric such as W.  It could be that the system that does best in the
subset is trumped at the universal set because the environmental con-
ditions in the universal set are different.  Extraordinary differences in
economic circumstances, security situations, ethnic rivalries, and so on
could lead W to violate some of Sen’s suggestions.  This might be be-
cause W may be context dependent—appropriate only for stable, de-
veloped democracies, for example.  But in the absence of either
property, the statement that a system delivers more social welfare be-
comes uninteresting, for the performance criteria is quite context
dependent.
It is for such reasons that we restrict our comparisons to similar
societies: the long-standing, advanced, industrialized, stable democra-
cies.  It still might be the case that such social properties as differences
in the citizens’ ethnic diversity affect the ability of a democratic system
to deliver comparable sorts of welfare, but we do not think so.  In-
deed, we argue that the long-term economic and socio-liberty context
of these societies is quite similar, and that they also have moved to-
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ward ever-increasing similarity on the ethnic diversity scale.15  And al-
though one might argue that people in each country have differing
desires, people everywhere appear to demand the satisfaction of basic
needs.  So, within the domain of our concern, it may not be such a
daunting task for our metric W to give us some “ordering” of system
performance.
B. Problems with Consequentialism for Social Welfare
Of course, it is one thing to argue that democracy can be justified
in terms of its beneficial impact on the individual citizen’s welfare, and
it is quite another to face the problem of what democracy implies for
the collective (or aggregate) welfare (W).  A claim that democracy is
justified by its impact on the collective welfare runs into a brick wall
defying both theoretical bashing and scaling.
One element of the wall is the seemingly insuperable problem of
the incommensurability of different individuals’ welfare and, hence,
the near impossibility of generating measures of aggregate welfare
that are comparable across groups or polities.  Utilitarianism, the most
ambitious attempt to provide such a metric, requires full interper-
sonal comparability of welfare states.  For an individual to accept utili-
tarianism, that assumption must be accepted.  For a society to use it,
there would have to be consensus on the metric.  Such consensus is
clearly not attainable.  If one cannot measure overall welfare, it is odd
to attempt to justify democracy on the basis of overall, or aggregate,
welfare.
The second component of the wall is Arrow’s General Possibility
Theorem.16  Arrow proves that one cannot expect democracy to re-
15. Of course, their historical paths to such diversity differ widely.  Only the U.S. had a
history of widespread slavery.  England, for another example, achieved diversity via quite a
different historical path from that of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
16. The problems identified in the “social choice” literature present problems for this
perspective. See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 46–60
(2nd ed. 1963) [hereinafter SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES] (proving and discuss-
ing the General Possibility Theorem); SEN, supra note 12, at 37–46 (discussing and analyz- R
ing Arrow’s General Possibility Theorem and its implications); Charles R. Plott, Axiomatic
Social Choice Theory: An Overview and Interpretation, 20 AM. J. POL. SCI. 511, 517–54 (1976)
(same).  The unavoidability of cyclical majorities or, alternatively, the surrender of a desira-
ble property of democracy, makes interpretation of political outcomes problematic.  Pre-
sumptions of probabilistic decision making on the part of representatives or voters permit
a reintegration of standard arguments regarding social welfare and individual choice. See
DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II, at 214 (rev. ed. 1989) (“[I]f voters reward a candi-
date who promises them a higher utility, by increasing the likelihood of voting for the
candidate, then competition for votes between candidates leads them ‘as if by an invisible
hand’ to platforms that maximize social welfare.”); Peter Coughlin, Expectations About Voter
Choices, 44 PUBLIC CHOICE 49 (1988) (analyzing and critiquing existing models predicting
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flect the decentralized citizens’ preferences adequately and still yield
normatively acceptable procedural and outcome qualities.17  Put sim-
ply, one cannot count on any reasonably acceptable democratic deci-
sion procedure to reliably produce results reflecting citizens’
aggregate welfare in an acceptable way.18  Indeed, the same holds true
if we merely try to mechanically aggregate individual welfare to gener-
ate a social welfare function.  At least, that is the result if we have no
interpersonal comparability.19
So the two problems with consequentialism for social welfare are
related.  Scaling this wall without interpersonal comparisons of wel-
fare is nigh impossible.  But we propose to tunnel below it.  To tunnel,
one has to pay careful attention to the floor.  In this case the floor
refers to something like a social safety net protecting the basic needs
of those who are not well off in society.  A relatively recent stream of
experimental research and a growing set of philosophical arguments
on the normative importance of fulfilling basic human needs provides
some perspective on this approach.  Indeed, our approach will be to
voter choices).  Amartya Sen pointed out that a general restriction of values held by the
citizenry would alleviate the problem.  Amartya K. Sen, A Possibility Theorem on Majority Deci-
sions, 34 ECONOMETRICA 491, 498 (1966).  Other paths are opened by Nicholas R. Miller,
who argues that one ought to conceptualize the relation between social choice and social
good not in terms of any one decision but rather by the trajectories of the policy paths. See
Nicholas R. Miller, Pluralism and Social Choice, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734, 742–43 (1983).
Further work has helped mitigate the problem to a degree. See generally GEORGE TSEBELIS,
VETO PLAYERS: HOW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS WORK (2002); Richard D. McKelvey, Covering,
Dominance, and Institution-Free Properties of Social Choice, 30 AM. J. POL. SCI. 283 (1986); Nor-
man Schofield, The Heart of a Polity, in COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING: SOCIAL CHOICE AND
POLITICAL ECONOMY 183 (Norman Schofield ed., 1996).  Kenneth Arrow himself has ar-
gued that a shared conception of some forms of justice can circumvent the social choice
problem. See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls’s Sense of
Justice, 70 J. PHIL. 245, 263 (1973), reprinted in 1 COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW
96, 114 (1984); Kenneth J. Arrow, Current Developments in the Theory of Social Choice, 44 SOC.
RES. 607 (1977), reprinted in 1 COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW, supra, at 162.
Moreover, in the most modern consequentialist theories, W is presumed, incorrectly, to be
additively separable.  Such an assumption amounts to a notion of “utilitarian” additivity of
welfare.  We build on this criticism in Norman Frohlich & Joe A. Oppenheimer, Justice,
Preferences and the Arrow Problem, 19 J. THEORETICAL POLS. 363 (2007), available at http://
www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/oppenheimer/research/condwin.pdf [hereinafter Justice, Prefer-
ences and the Arrow Problem].  Additive separability rules out all synergies and team interde-
pendencies among members of society.  As such, it does violence to the very notion of
society and, hence, is perniciously wrong.  Joe A. Oppenheimer, Considering Social Justice: A
Review of David Miller’s Principles of Social Justice, 15 SOC. JUST. RES. 295, 303 & n.11 (2002)
(book review).
17. See SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES, supra note 16, at 59 (setting out the R
conditions that could characterize “reasonably acceptable” structures).
18. Id.
19. Obviously, full comparability allows for results—that is the contribution of the orig-
inal utilitarian argument.
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assert this perspective, thus allowing enough interpersonal compara-
bility to yield a partial metric: one that circumvents the strongest im-
possibility results.  But first we look a bit more closely at the problem
of interpersonal comparability.
1. Interpersonal Comparability of Welfare
In virtually all modern theories of democracy, the extent to which
any outcome is deemed good rests at least in part on the relationship
between that outcome and some notion of social welfare and group
choice procedures.  To some extent it is assumed that the voting rule
can (usually) deliver the right results20 given the citizens’ preferences
(R), and presumed choices.  But, it is at this point that the traditional
economic approach to characterizing the Good, and the better, has
foundered for lack of interpersonal comparisons.  This is because to
understand the aggregate welfare from the set of individuals’ welfare,
we need some sort of metric for interpersonal aggregation.
To illustrate, let us start by presuming no metric.  Then the tradi-
tional economic approach yields Pareto Optimality.21  Such a concep-
tion yields a “large” Pareto set.  Without other considerations, one is
powerless both to compare the social welfare of different possible
states within the Pareto set, and to make any judgments regarding dis-
20. Amartya Sen has made telling arguments against the simple utilization of income
or welfare as a metric. See generally AMARTYA K. SEN, Famines and Other Crises, in DEVELOP-
MENT AS FREEDOM 160 (1999) (arguing that political freedom and economic power must be
considered in analyzing the causes of famine and social welfare generally) [hereinafter
Famines and Other Crises]. See also Amartya K. Sen, Utilitarianism and Welfarism, 76 J. PHIL.
463, 472 (1979) (critiquing the practice of measuring society’s welfare “in terms of the
‘median’ person”); Amartya K. Sen, Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination, 45
ECONOMETRICA 53 (1977).  But capabilities, Sen’s elaborate improvement on welfarism,
does not fundamentally change our argument; indeed, it reinforces it.
21. The eponymous notion of Pareto Optimality was first articulated by Vilfredo
Pareto, a traditionally liberal Italian economist of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
centuries.  Pareto Optimality is a condition or state that is desirable and is best first de-
scribed by its failure.  When a situation is not optimal, or is suboptimal, at least some of the
individuals could be made better off without hurting anyone.  On the other hand, when a
situation is optimal, to make someone still better off requires that at least one person in
the group must be hurt.  The set of outcomes that satisfy this notion of optimality is usually
referred to as the Pareto set.  The notion ties into efficiency and also has a direct relation-
ship to “unanimity” voting outcomes.  A group that uses unanimity to make decisions
would choose to move from a status quo only if all benefited and none were hurt, or
perhaps even if some benefited and none were hurt (if abstaining did not count as a “nay”
vote).  The relationship between Pareto Optimality and efficiency can be understood quite
easily: if one person’s scraps are sufficiently useful to another so that the user will either
pick them up or compensate for the clean up, then it is inefficient to leave the scraps
unused.  Note that no interpersonal comparisons are needed to make judgments as to
what constitutes the Pareto set.
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tributive justice.22  More content must be given to either W or R if one
wishes to develop a more powerful notion of what is better within the
Pareto set.  The traditional behavioral model based on pure self-inter-
est yields no clues as to how to formulate such a metric because, by
design, such models posit the absence of links among the different wel-
fare states of individuals.  All solutions that go beyond Pareto Optimal-
ity and try to link aggregation of choices to any notion of welfare
require interpersonal comparisons.
And then there is always a need to map the decentralized choices
of citizens being aggregated in a democracy to aggregate welfare.  For
a simple illustration, consider majority rule: to link even majority rule
to a sensible aggregate welfare notion, one would need to say both
that (1) the difference between a yea/nay vote amounted to the same
cardinal welfare gain or loss for each voter, and (2) that the voters
ought to be counted equally.  In general, two sorts of analytic moves
are taken to minimize these problems.
The first has to do with the introduction of more sophisticated
preference measures.  So, for example, majority rule asks for very little
information from the voter, requiring only the voter’s first choice.
Rather than using simple majority rule as an institution to elicit pref-
erences, one might employ a Borda count.  With a Borda ballot, the
voter is asked to rank all the candidates.  A higher rank is worth more
points.  For example, if there are, say, four candidates, the top rank is
given four points and each subsequent ranked alternative is given one
less (so a third place vote gives the candidate only two points).  The
winner is determined by adding up the total points given to each can-
didate, and the one with the most points wins.  Of course, Borda can
be said to do a better job than majority rule; after all, the voters are
giving much more information about how the outcomes affect them.
But there is still a need to map the votes being aggregated—in this
case, the points—to aggregate welfare.  And this merely requires dif-
ferent assumptions regarding what interpersonal comparisons must
be made to treat the aggregate Borda vote count as a legitimate mea-
sure of social welfare; it does not let us avoid the need for direct
comparison.
We now consider the second standard analytical move that is
made to minimize the problems of mapping individual choices to ag-
gregate welfare. This simplification is achieved by making assumptions
22. For example, if there are two persons, one very rich and one very poor, who simul-
taneously lay claim to a coin on the street, Pareto cannot say which of the two should
receive it.  Were the rich person to get it, one could not “redistribute it” to the poor with-
out the rich person suffering a loss, and vice versa.
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constraining preferences, or the cognitive or behavioral bases for
choice.  For example, one can employ a spatial model of the possible
political outcomes.  In this case, each individual has a preference for
proximity of the outcome to their “ideal” outcome in the space.  As
long as the space is one dimensional we get an equilibrium with some
normatively attractive properties.  But how this is associated with W is
left undefined unless one interprets the distances among the voters as
equivalent.  This is usually difficult to do since the space is defined
with only an ordinal metric for the preferences over distance.  Simi-
larly, one can assume probabilistic choice responses by voters.  That
literature shows that we can generate Benthamite social welfare func-
tions from two-party spatial competition in these circumstances.23  But
such conclusions require a notion that the individual’s probabilistic
response is a basis for welfare comparison between individuals.  In this
argument, the interpersonal utility comparison is an assumption that
equal responsiveness between voters reflects equal, comparable utility
stakes.  Of course, one also needs the assumption of each voter’s equal
weight in the aggregate welfare calculus.
Such assumptions may be interesting for model builders, but they
hardly take the place of more robust notions of comparability for justi-
fying constitutional proposals.  One is left with the notion that compa-
rability of preferences is not going to be a rich vein to mine.  But, of
course, this does not mean that we can make no comparisons regard-
ing individual welfare.
More recent conceptions of how aggregate improvements in wel-
fare might be characterized are all developed on somewhat less de-
manding interpersonal metrics and have allowed the conception of
justice to regain life in democratic theory.24  Rawls in particular argues
that social welfare reflects only the welfare of the least fortunate.25
With satiability, or the idea that the least fortunate count as special
23. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III, at 254 (2005) (reviewing the spatial
voting and probabilistic literature).
24. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Extended Sympathy and the Possibility of Social Choice, 67 AM.
ECON. REV. 219 (1977), reprinted in 1 COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW, supra note
16, at 147 (upholding the view that such lexicographic principles of justice are sufficient R
criteria for generating coherent social decisions); RAWLS, supra note 2, at 10–15 (discussing
justice in the context of democracy); JOHN E. ROEMER, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY 2 (1998)
(presenting alternative views to consider improving the worst off).
25. See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 65 (stating that a framework of institutions attempting to R
capture individual equality is only just if it “improves the expectations” of the society’s
poorest members).
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only when their welfare is below a “welfare floor,”26 such a conception
of welfare can lead to a partial ordering of social welfare states.
2. Needs: A Proposal
The notion that needs can serve as a major normative element in
social welfare has a long history, but in recent times its status has
grown anew from the seeds planted by Rawls.27  In brief, Rawls built
on Harsanyi’s insight that one might be able to identify what is fair in
income distribution by conducting a kind of thought experiment in
which impartial reasoning is induced.28  In particular, Harsanyi won-
dered what people would choose from among many possible income
distributions were they ignorant of that share of the income distribu-
tion they would get.29  A lack of knowledge about which share they
would get created impartiality.30  Harsanyi argued that people would
choose the distribution that maximizes the expected value of the
group’s payoffs.31  He concluded that the emergence of the principle
of maximizing expected value under conditions of impartiality lent
the resultant preferences (and the chosen principle of maximized ex-
pected value, ethical standing).32
Rawls elaborated and developed a similar scenario of imperfect
information (he called a “veil of ignorance”), applying it to questions
of distributive justice.33  Rawls imagined a group of representative in-
dividuals charged with the task of choosing, “from behind the veil of
ignorance,” a way of organizing income distribution (and other mat-
ters) in the (as yet unknown) society which they were to inhabit.34
The trick built into Rawls’s veil of ignorance is that it stripped individ-
uals of their interests.35  They were assumed not to know their own
places in society, their own particular skills, plans, advantages, and dis-
26. See CHOOSING JUSTICE: AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO ETHICAL THEORY, supra note
3 (explaining that the welfare floor principle “considers only the welfare of the worst-off R
individual in society” and requires a presumption of insatiability, and that if as basic needs
are met the welfare improvements are less important, a different principle is needed); see
also Choosing Justice in Experimental Democracies with Production, supra note 3, at 463, 474 (con- R
cluding that individuals everywhere seem to believe that the welfare of the worst-off indi-
vidual in a group should not fall below a certain threshold).
27. See generally RAWLS, supra note 2. R
28. See id. at 15–17.
29. Harsanyi, supra note 1. R
30. Id.
31. Id. at 435.
32. Id.
33. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 250–51 (discussing impartial decision making and distribu- R
tive justice in the context of the “veil of ignorance”).
34. See id. at 118.
35. Id.
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advantages.36  No one knew what role they would play in the society to
be formed.37  This ignorance would require that each associate her or
his lot impartially with that of every person in society.38  Making deci-
sions impartially would channel rational self-interested behavior in the
direction of justice and fairness.39  Rawls, however, came to a different
conclusion than did Harsanyi.  Using notions of minimax choice rules
borrowed from game theoretic arguments, Rawls argued that under
conditions similar to those described by Harsanyi, individuals would
select an entirely different principle of distributive justice.  He con-
cluded that they would want to maximize the welfare of the worst-off
individual in the society40—a principle Rawls called the “difference
principle.”41
One of the major problems with this conclusion was the potential
insatiability of the aim of maximizing the welfare of the worst off.42  In
the minds of many, the concern with the worst off would seem to be
motivated by some notion not of place (worst),43 but rather of sub-
stantive deprivation and ensuing poverty and despair.  Our experi-
ments44 reflect that the concern induced by a veil of ignorance is not
about place, but about substantive issues of poverty.  These issues lead
people to talk of establishing a welfare floor through social policy.
The use of imperfect information to induce impartial reasoning
by Rawls and Harsanyi led them to focus on the pattern of the result-
ing distribution, rather than on other aspects of the problem.  But
other authors objected strenuously to their concentration on distribu-
tive patterns.  Spearheaded by Robert Nozick, these critics under-
scored the role of property rights or ownership (just compensation for
work and other entitlements) in questions of distributing property
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 119.
39. Id. at 118–23.
40. Rawls introduces the notion of “primary goods” and discusses his principle in terms
of increasing the primary goods available to the worst-off individual. Id. at 65.  We occa-
sionally use the term “welfare” as a shorthand for his technical term.
41. Id.
42. Charles R. Plott, Rawls’s Theory of Justice: An Impossibility Result, in DECISION THEORY
AND SOCIAL ETHICS: ISSUES IN SOCIAL CHOICE 201, 202 (Hans W. Gottinger & Werner
Leinfellner eds., 1978) (discussing the potential insatiability of the following principle: “So-
cial and economic inequalities are to meet two conditions: they must be (a) to the greatest
expected benefit to the least advantaged members of society; and (b) attached to offices
and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.”).
43. It is logical that someone has to occupy the place of worst off.
44. See generally CHOOSING JUSTICE: AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO ETHICAL THEORY,
supra note 3; Choosing Justice in Experimental Democracies with Production, supra note 3. R
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and income.45  From Nozick’s perspective, emphasis should be placed
upon fair procedures for maintaining entitlement to the rightful fruit
of one’s labor.46  In theory, a clear tension exists between these two
approaches: entitlement leads one to question the legitimacy of any
requirement to redistribute well-gotten gains.  By contrast, justice
based on patterns usually requires some degree of redistribution as a
minimal requirement of fairness.
Noting this tension between entitlements and redistribution, the-
orists have voiced concern about the potential instability of any pat-
terned principle of distributive justice.  Although a pattern principle
may appear fair when chosen without full knowledge of any one indi-
vidual’s position in the system, that same principle could begin to
chafe in practice, when individuals begin to feel entitled to the prop-
erty they earn.
Rawls emphasized the welfare of the poorest individuals in his
development of a metric and understanding of distributive justice.47
In doing so, he skirted the issue of “preferences” altogether by classify-
ing certain goods as having “special” consideration. In setting up his
analysis, he did not explicitly focus on “needs,” but perhaps it was im-
plicit in his discussion.  In any case, many volumes, articles, and exper-
iments later, needs were picked up, explicitly this time, by
Braybrooke.48
Braybrooke initiated a recent stream of argument in philosophy,
which was added to by Doyle and Gough,49 and which has been re-
cently elaborated upon and applied to questions of international jus-
tice by Brock.50  Those arguments emphasize the advantages of using
basic needs as a metric for an important component of individual wel-
fare.  Braybrooke argues that it is possible to identify the basic needs
associated with physical and social functioning.51  Doyle and Gough
underline the need for physical health and autonomy “to be able to
participate in a cultural form of life . . . [to] have the physical, intellec-
tual and emotional capacity to interact with fellow actors over sus-
tained periods in ways which are valued and reinforced in some
45. NOZICK, supra note 10, at 171–72. R
46. Id. (stating that the end result of distributive justice should be to give each citizen
an enforceable property right in his or her share of the total social output).
47. See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 65 (“The intuitive idea is that the social order is not to R
establish and secure the more attractive prospects of those better off unless doing so is to
the advantage of those less fortunate.”).
48. See generally BRAYBROOKE, supra note 5. R
49. LEN DOYAL & IAN GOUGH, A THEORY OF HUMAN NEED (1991).
50. Brock, supra note 4. R
51. BRAYBROOKE, supra note 5, at 36. R
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way.”52  Brock argues that focusing on basic needs is a way of getting at
what may constitute global justice.53  And the common thread that
runs through their arguments is that basic needs, although not com-
pletely free of ambiguity, are sufficiently clear to generate interper-
sonal consensus regarding their evaluation.  With relatively little
information, one can tell when another person is starving, freezing to
death, suffering from heat prostration, illiterate, etc.
Experimental research on questions of distributive justice
modeled on the “veil of ignorance” has, in the main, supported this
line of reasoning.  It has revealed considerable uniformity in subjects’
ethical responses to needs.  Those experiments demonstrate a virtual
consensus across a variety of societies regarding the importance of
providing a floor of income for those who are incapable of providing
for themselves.54  The arguments subjects brought forward in support
of such a floor are that there will always be individuals incapable of
providing for their own basic needs, and that society has an obligation
52. DOYAL & GOUGH, supra note 49, at 69. R
53. Brock, supra note 4 (arguing that “needs are tremendously salient in developing R
any plausible account of global justice”).
54. See, e.g., CHOOSING JUSTICE: AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO ETHICAL THEORY, supra
note 3, at 56 (noting that experimental subjects uniformly “reached consensus on a single
principle of distributive justice as the ‘most fair’”); Doug Bond & Jong-Chul Park, An Em-
pirical Test of Rawls’s Theory of Justice: A Second Approach, in Korea and the United States, 22
SIMULATION AND GAMING 443 (1991) (finding that Korean subjects’ individual preferences
reflect a concern for a high minimum floor); Choosing Justice in Experimental Democracies with
Production, supra note 3, at 463 (concluding that individuals generally believe that the in- R
come of the worst-off individual in a group should not fall below a certain threshold);
Norman Frohlich, Joe A. Oppenheimer & Cheryl L. Eavey, Choices of Principles of Distributive
Justice in Experimental Groups, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 606, 628–29 (1987) (finding that subjects
were concerned not only with maximizing average social welfare, but also with setting a
floor to protect the welfare of the poorest) [hereinafter Choices of Principles]; Norman Froh-
lich, Joe A. Oppenheimer & Cheryl Eavey, Laboratory Results on Rawls’s Distributive Justice, 17
BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 1, 1 (1987) (“[I]ndividuals are capable of reaching consensus” on a
principle of distributive justice “which attempts to take into account . . . the position of the
worst-off individuals.”); Michael Jackson & Peter Hill, A Fair Share, 7 J. THEORETICAL POL.
169, 176–78 (1995) (finding that subjects uniformly preferred “maximizing the average
with a floor restraint”); James Konow, A Positive Theory of Economic Fairness, 31 J. ECON.
BEHAV. AND ORG. 13, 33 (1996) (concluding that altruism, defined as “a selfless concern for
the allocation of others which becomes particularly acute when their basic needs are
threatened,” may sometimes impact individuals’ notions of justice); Grzegorz Lissowski,
Tadeusz Tyszka & Wlodzimierz Okrasa, Principles of Distributive Justice: Experiments in Poland
and America, 35 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 98 (1991) (replicating Frohlich & Oppenheimer’s dis-
tributive justice experiment in Poland and finding that subjects preferred maximizing aver-
age income with a floor constraint); Paul E. Oleson, An Experimental Examination of
Alternative Theories of Distributive Justice and Economic Fairness, Paper presented at
Public Choice in San Francisco, CA (Mar. 1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univer-
sity of Arizona) (on file with author) (same); Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Shusuke Takahashi, and
Stephen Turnbull, Justice in Income Distribution: An Experimental Approach, Paper
presented at the 1996 ISA in San Diego, CA (Apr. 18, 1996) (same).
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to care for the basic needs of its most vulnerable members.  As in the
arguments of Nozick and others noted above, subjects also argued
that the safety net offered should not be so high as to impinge on the
entitlements of those who are very productive or to unduly reduce the
incentives needed in the society to encourage others to maintain a
modicum of efficiency.55
a. Needs and Interpersonal Comparability
This leads one to wonder how the focus on needs relates to the
difficulties in defining or measuring social welfare (W).  Consider
comparability; obviously, it does not take a huge moral stretch to com-
pare one person’s starvation with another’s banquet.  In other words,
easy accessibility to consensus on what constitutes a floor of basic
needs may be the basis for partially undermining the barrier to inter-
personal comparability of welfare, at least within the restricted range
of needy individuals.56
Given the notion that at least the most basic needs are lexico-
graphically prior to other concerns regarding personal welfare consid-
erations, the difficulties of some aspects of interpersonal
comparability disappear.57  We can identify some sorts of comparisons
that can be made and others that cannot.  Take two individuals: if one
has all her basic needs met, and the other does not, then we can judge
the first to be better off than the other.  Otherwise we cannot make a
judgment.  But given that basic needs are quite fundamental, and that
democracy has a presumption of equality, we can develop a rough
estimation of social welfare in terms of the percentage of the popula-
tion left without the satisfaction of their basic needs.  Of course, there
are other aspects of measurement that might be crucial.  Take a family
in poverty for example: the depth and duration of the family’s poverty
might be an important further dimension of analysis.
In any case, it is clear that as Braybrooke points out, at the theo-
retical level, Pareto Optimality is not what is left to utilitarianism with-
out interpersonal utility comparison, unless we agree that preference
55. See, e.g., Choices of Principles, supra note 54. R
56. This does little violence to Mill’s conception of utilitarianism.  As he argued, a
happy life requires basic needs being met and little else: “The present wretched education,
and wretched social arrangements, are the only real hindrance to [a happy life] being
attainable by almost all.”  John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, in THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS
FROM BACON TO MILL 895, 905 (Edwin A. Burtt ed., 1939).
57. Note also that life support needs are lexicographically prior to needs supporting
social functioning.
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satisfaction rather than needs satisfaction are to replace utility or
happiness.58
b. Needs: A Social Welfare Metric and the Arrow Problem
Braybrooke also conjectures that a focus on needs instead of pref-
erences could get around some of the paradoxes of social choice the-
ory.59  But here, his conjecture is sure to lead to less headway than in
the previous discussion.  Although needs alone cannot help us get
around some of the difficulties of voting cycles, they can point to ways
of doing so.60  Further, they do help us generate a slightly more inter-
pretable mapping from the welfare of individuals to an aggregate con-
ception of social welfare.  But immediately we see that the victory will
be incomplete.  Without further assumptions, we will have little more
leverage than that gained by Pareto Optimality.  After all, once we
note that a society has not met the basic needs of all its citizenry we
will have difficulty assessing the degree of failure without further (nor-
mative) assumptions.  The percentage of the population left without
basic needs being met can be used to develop a partial ordering of
social welfare; however, we will not get a full-blown ordering without
severe assumptions.
TABLE 1: TOWARD A SOCIAL WELFARE METRIC
SOCIETIES % OF POP NEEDY SOCIAL
IN BOTH WELFARE
ONLY IN D1 ONLY IN D2 D1&2 RANK
A 0 0 0 1
B 10 0 0 2/3
C 5 5 0 2/3
D 0 0 10 4/5
E 10 10 0 4/5
But this need not mean that we should give up entirely.  Consider
the illustration in Table 1.  Here we list five societies that presumably
differ only in the percentage of the population that are “needy.”  In
58. BRAYBROOKE, supra note 5, at 175–76. R
59. Id. at 184 (“Agreeing to meet needs . . . before attending to matters of preference
only may have extricated the most important questions from the difficulties of social
choice theory.”).
60. To do that, needs would have to be weighed heavily in our preference functions.
We show how this might generate a Condorcet winner. See generally Justice, Preferences and
the Arrow Problem, supra note 16. R
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the illustration, there are two dimensions of neediness: D1 and D2.
Obviously, a society like A, which has no needy individuals, is ranked
highest.  In B and C, ten percent of the population is needy along one
dimension.  In B, they are all needy in one way, while in C they are
split over the two types of neediness.  Making no judgment regarding
the weights of one or another basic needs, B and C would be tied for
second and third place in terms of social welfare delivery. D, on the
other hand, has the same ten percent needy, but now all of them are
needy along two dimensions.  Of course, one will need ancillary no-
tions, such as, for example, that the “depth of need” is equivalent in
all cases for each dimension, but given such assumptions, it is pre-
sumed that having two shortcomings (e.g., housing and food) is worse
than having only one.  So D is “worse” than B or C.  But how we would
compare D and E is unclear without further assumptions.  Although
there are more persons who are in need in E, they all have only one
deprivation, while in D they have two.
The illustration gives us some insight as to what it would take to
develop a more complete metric.  One would need to specify tradeoffs
between the numbers of people who are needy and the depth of their
deprivation.  And the metric for the depth of deprivation is also not
unambiguous.  There will be various statistical measures of it that may
need consideration including minima and measures of dispersion.61
C. Democracy and Needs
The above discussion can be tied to the justification for democ-
racy in the developed, liberal societies.  For democratic citizens to play
their role, they must (along with certain well-known rights) have the
capacity to inform themselves and participate in the political process.
In a democracy, it is important to maintain prosperity, handle ethnic
strife, etc., and proactively deal with the basic needs of the citizenry.
Assuming this to be demonstrable, then those citizens who lack the
basic needs to provide for physical and social functioning are essen-
tially disenfranchised, and the presumed fruits of democracy are de
facto denied them.  This has been recognized as far back as Aristotle,
one of the initial—though limited—champions of democracy.  In
Politics, Aristotle discusses the functions of the democratic state:
First, there must be food . . . .  Let me . . . discuss the
distribution of the land . . . for I do not think that property
ought to be common, . . . but only that by friendly consent
61. See generally AMARTYA SEN, ON ECONOMIC INEQUALITY (1973) (discussing statistical
measures of inequality).
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there should be a common use of it; and that no citizen
should be in want of subsistence.
As to common meals, there is a general agreement that
a well-ordered city should have them . . . .  They ought, how-
ever, to be open to all the citizens.  And yet it is not easy for
the poor to contribute the requisite sum out of their private
means, and to provide also for their household. . . .  The
land must therefore be divided into two parts, one public
and the other private, . . . part [of the public land being]
used to defray the cost of the common meals . . . .62
Thus, Aristotle recognized the requirement that democratic
states provide sustenance for the basic needs of their citizenry.  In
modern times, while acknowledging that differences among individu-
als may require different levels of resources to meet citizens’ basic
needs, Braybrooke argues that considerations of justice require that
all basic needs be met to a minimum standard for all individuals in
societies.  He notes that these basic needs include the necessities for
both physical and social functioning.63  Within the realm of social
functioning he argues that there are several basic roles in which all
citizens are expected to perform: “parent, householder, worker, and
citizen.”64  He offers a normative principle that a minimum standard
be set for the resources necessary to insure physical survival and per-
formance of each of the roles.  While declining to assign priority to
any particular requisite in any particular category of basic needs, he
enunciates a principle of lexical provision within each category of
need.  By this he means that the appropriate method for society to
meet basic needs is to set a minimal level of provision for each need
and allocate resources so that after the minimum level for meeting
needs in one category is achieved, no more resources are to be allo-
cated towards them, and additional resources are to go to meeting
needs in another category, until the minimal level agreed upon by
society for all basic needs is achieved for all citizens.65
Following Braybrooke’s formulation, and given the justification
for democracy noted above, we argue that the promise that democ-
racy makes is that it will meet the basic needs of citizens across the
various roles they are expected to play in the democratic state.  Sen’s
62. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, in 2 THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 445, 532, 534 (Benjamin Jowett
trans., W.D. Ross ed., 1952).
63. BRAYBROOKE, supra note 5, at 36. R
64. Id. at 48.  He also notes that, to the extent that individuals either opt out of one or
more of these roles or are incapable of performing in them for insuperable reasons, the
level of provision for their basic needs can be adjusted. Id. at 49–50.
65. See id. at 69–70.
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observation that famines do not occur in democracies66 can be taken
as evidence that democracies take this charge seriously.  But prelimi-
nary evidence shows considerable variance in the delivery of a floor
for minimal needs, even for such natural disasters at which Sen was
looking.  Take three cases: an enormous ice storm in the winter of
1998 in Quebec that threatened hundreds of thousands—if not mil-
lions—in the province; the horrible heat wave in France in the sum-
mer of 2003; and Hurricane Katrina in fall 2005 in the United States.
Although the events are not strictly comparable, the death tolls are
staggeringly different: 25 in Quebec, 14,802 in France, and more than
1,800 in Katrina.  Clearly, there is a difference in the quality of re-
sponse to the needy in developed democratic societies.
1. A Preliminary Inventory of Needs
We still need some detail in order to approach an empirical task
of evaluation.  What, for example, constitute the specific needs that
are under consideration?  Although Braybrooke himself proposes a
list of needs (as do others, including the United Nations) divided into
two subsets: physical and social functioning of the individual, the list is
quite sparse and intuitive.  For physical functioning, he sets out: a life-
supporting relation to the environment, food and water, excretion,
exercise, rest, sleep, and preservation of the intact body.67  Similarly,
he identifies, for social functioning: companionship, education, social
acceptance, sexual activity, freedom from harassment, life without
constant fear, and recreation.68  Now, not all of these are state respon-
sibilities, although the state might be said to be required to insure that
others (e.g., violent gangs or mobsters) do not deprive individuals of
these basic needs.
Gillian Brock is a bit more abstract in her approach when she
says: “a need is basic if satisfying it is a necessary condition for human
agency.”69  Brock notes that by linking inclusion on the list to agency,
one
can circumvent concerns about how an account of such
needs could be sufficiently “objective” . . . [to] . . . enjoy
66. See Famines and Other Crises, supra note 20, at 178 (“[T]here has never been a famine R
in a functioning multiparty democracy.”); Amartya Sen, Democracy as a Universal Value, 10 J.
DEMOCRACY 3, 7–8 (1999) (“[N]o substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent
and democratic country with a relatively free press.”); see also AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND
FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT AND DEPRAVATION 6, 6 (1988) (“[T]here are no fam-
ines in rich developed countries.”).
67. BRAYBROOKE, supra note 5, at 36. R
68. Id.
69. GILLIAN BROCK, COSMOPOLITANISM AND GLOBAL JUSTICE (forthcoming).
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widespread cross-cultural support . . . .  For instance, by defi-
nition, to be an agent one must be able to deliberate and
choose.  In order to deliberate and choose one will need at
least (1) a certain amount of physical and mental health, (2)
sufficient security to be able to act, (3) a sufficient level of
understanding of what one is choosing between, and (4) a
certain amount of autonomy. Because of its important role
in developing (1)–(4), I also add a fifth basic need that un-
derlines the importance of our social needs; namely, (5) de-
cent social relations with at least some others.70
So we can see enumeration is possible, and given that each soci-
ety is a bit different, there may be slight variations in what are the
actual instantiations of basic needs, requiring quite different details in
Brisbane than in Banda Ache.  But food, shelter, health, education,
and work (or other economic support when work is impossible) all
come into play.  Because there is far less variation in the structure of
these items among the developed democracies than between any of
them and members of the less developed and non-democratic coun-
tries, we can make comparisons regarding shortfalls quite easily.
But before entering the realm of empirical testing, it is important
to enter a caveat.  In the experiments on distributive justice cited
above, subjects identified three normative components.  Although
needs were a pre-eminent factor, subjects were also concerned with
efficiency and just desserts.  While we acknowledge the necessity of
paying homage to some economic efficiency and just deserts, which
have normative standing in their own rights (while also being instru-
mental in achieving efficiency), we side with Aristotle and those others
who give priority to basic needs.  Accordingly, we propose that a first
level evaluative criterion of democracies should be the extent to which
they meet the basic needs of their citizens.  This is in keeping with the
formulation by Braybrooke that we fulfill needs lexicographically but
with satiation.71
However, this argument brings us back to the observation with
which we started: the differences in distributions of income and
wealth within different developed democracies clearly lead to differ-
ences in the way and extent to which democracies meet (or do not
meet) the basic needs of their citizens.  Even in the most developed
democracies where societal wealth is clearly sufficient to take care of
the basic needs of all citizens to some reasonable minimum level (the
social safety net), there are numerous individuals who do not get the
70. Id.
71. BRAYBROOKE, supra note 5, at 69. R
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minimal support they need.  In some fundamental sense, then, the
justification for these democracies is undercut.  If “life” is interpreted
as the requisites of fulfilling the societal roles of a parent, house-
holder, worker, and citizen, then clearly, in virtually all developed de-
mocracies, variable numbers of citizens are denied “life.”  Moreover,
they have liberty only to function in a limited fashion, and are handi-
capped in their pursuit of happiness.  It would seem reasonable to use
the justificatory criterion of “satisfying basic needs” as a way of evaluat-
ing democratic performance.
II. EVALUATING DEMOCRACIES
Obviously, we have not developed sufficient fabric in the discus-
sion of needs to give us a full template for the evaluation of demo-
cratic performance.  For example, are we to evaluate societies only by
the proportion of the citizenry in need, or also by their duration in
such a condition?72  Are we to consider all individuals in need equally
deprived, or are the levels of need and the number of needs that are
left unattended to be considered?  Raising these concerns indicates
that there is more analytic work on the metric of needs that must to be
done; however, at this point, we turn to another problem.
A. Why an Exogenous Metric to Evaluate Democracies?
Imagine a democracy that does not choose to satisfy the basic
needs of its citizens.  If the democracy is stable and people seem satis-
fied, who is to say that the result does not reflect the values of the
citizenry?  And what is to justify the imposition of a set of values that
might be quite foreign to the populace?  Indeed, looking at needs
rather than preferences as an indicator of social welfare induces a ma-
jor problem.  Preferences are directly tied to choice.  If preferences
are given priority in considering social welfare, there is at least a pre-
sumption that the satisfaction of political preferences is via responsive
collective choice.  Social welfare is then tied directly to the satisfaction
of individuals in their democracy by simple measures of responsive-
ness of the outcomes to the shifts in preferences of the citizens.
Moving to need satisfaction seems to involve an imposition of an
exogenous measuring rod of evaluation, an imposition quite at odds
with the entire normative justification of democracy.73  In the tradi-
72. See generally ROBERT E. GOODIN ET AL., THE REAL WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM 7
(1999) (assessing welfare regimes by investigating several dimensions of poverty, including
duration).
73. Indeed, Andrew Schotter argues that any evaluation of democracy requires a fully
endogenous metric of justice. ANDREW SCHOTTER, FREE MARKET ECONOMICS: A CRITICAL
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tion of economics such an argument would be quite devastating.
Economists presume that each individual has a unique and stable
preference structure.  Such a view would mean that the citizenry’s set
of preferences are fixed, and although there can be instability in polit-
ical outcomes for all the reasons identified above, as well as induced
by changes in the environment, outcomes reflect the rules of the
game and the set of preferences of the citizens.
The traditional view requires that individuals have unique, stable,
well-ordered preference structures.  So entrenched was this idea that
only a few years ago most sophisticated political scientists and many
economists presumed rationality to be a tautology; how could it be
otherwise?  Of course, much earlier, Kenneth May had shown that the
premise was not a tautology.74  But at least since the mid-seventies, the
stability, uniqueness, and interpretability of preferences has been
under attack by cognitive psychologists.  Consistent maximizing might
not be a part of human nature after all.75  Indeed, the experiments
that resulted in Prospect Theory demonstrated that the stability of
preferences, and hence individual choices, are sensitive to the individ-
ual’s interpretation of the decision context, and thus, dependent
upon the way the decision problem is framed.76
The clear conclusion of the experimental and theoretical work is
that cues that are given in the decision context determine the value
structures that are evoked, and, consequently, the choices that are
APPRAISAL, 121–24 (Basil Blackwell 2d ed. 1990) (1985).  Exogenous theories, such as those
of Rawls and Braybrooke, were criticized as not reflecting the inherent self determination
behind the theory of democracy. Id. at 122–23.  But Schotter goes on to show that an
endogenous theory has problems of its own. Id. at 124.
74. See Kenneth O. May, Intransitivity, Utility, and the Aggregation of Preference Patterns, 22
ECONOMETRICA 1 (1954) (arguing that experimental evidence of intransitivity of prefer-
ence structures could undercut the basic assumptions of utility theory).
75. See generally David M. Grether & Charles R. Plott, Economic Theory of Choice and the
Preference Reversal Phenomenon, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 623 (1979) (discussing psychological data
and theories that suggest that “no optimization principles of any sort lie behind even the
simplest of human choices”); George A. Quattrone & Amos Tversky, Contrasting Rational
and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 719 (1988) (discussing the
psychological and cognitive theory objections to the common assumption that economic
and political agents tend to maximize utility); Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36
J. ECON. LIT. 11, 11 (1988) (same); Eldar Shafir & Amos Tversky, Decision Making, in AN
INVITATION TO COGNITIVE SCIENCE: THINKING 77, 93 (Edward E. Smith & Daniel N. Osher-
son eds., 2d ed. 1995) (examining alternatives to the rational theory of choice); Herbert A.
Simon, Rationality in Psychology and Economics, 59 J. BUS. S209 (1986) (same); Amos Tversky
& Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251, S251–52
(1986) (same).
76. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of
Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 453 (1981).
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made.77  To demonstrate how context can evoke different preference
structures, we crafted a set of dictator experiments with a slight varia-
tion.78  Rather than simply giving dictators money to allocate, dictators
and their paired other subject produced income by doing work.79
Then the dictators allocated the total joint income anonymously.80
Our conjectures were that the work context would (1) evoke “entitle-
ment” values of a normative nature, (2) lead to more sharing on the
part of the dictators than in a normal dictator experiment, and (3)
cause the sharing to conform to some normative rules reflecting enti-
tlement.81  The conjectures held up.82
If, as demonstrated in the experiments cited above, preferences
are unstable and manipulable, the evaluation of democratic perform-
ance in terms of its responsiveness becomes more problematic.
Which preferences are being evoked by the democratic political insti-
tutions may determine many aspects of the policy outcomes in the
democracy.
Are we to judge a democracy by its satisfaction of the expressed
preferences of the individuals, disregarding the cues that led to their
expression?  Imagine two countries, similar in most relevant respects,
but differing in how the political systems frame their (similar) crime
problems.  In one, the framing of response to theft is in terms of reha-
bilitation and social responsibility, and in the other it is in terms of
fear and animosity.  The political discussions in the two countries lead
to differing outcomes regarding the treatment of their thieves.  The
first punishes them with forced restitution, community service, and
rehabilitation programs.  The second cuts off one of their hands and
sends them to jail.  In both, assume the same rates of recidivism and
the like (in other words nothing is gained by the severity of treat-
ment).  What are the differing preferences involved?  Are they basic
differences, or a function of the nature of the political discussions?  Is
part of our evaluation of the differing political systems to include how
they handle the discussion of, and present the policy alternatives re-
garding the issue?  Or are we to say the two political systems re-
sponded equally to the expressed values of the citizens?
77. Norman Frohlich & Joe A. Oppenheimer, Skating on Thin Ice: Cracks in the Public
Choice Foundation, 18 J. THEORETICAL POL. 235, 251 (2006).
78. Norman Frohlich, Joe A. Oppenheimer & Anja Kurki, Problems in Modeling Social
Preferences: Insights from Modified Dictator Experiments, 119 PUB. CHOICE 91, 92 (2004).
79. Id. at 95.
80. Id. at 102.
81. Id. at 95.
82. Id. at 111.
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We believe an aspect of the evaluation of a democratic system is
normative, going beyond conformity with what the people want.  If
different contexts and frames generate different preferences, we may
need to judge the frames as well as the conformity to expressed
desires.  Part of what is ethical involves choosing options through im-
partial reasoning.  Political systems are likely to differ in how much
they invoke impartial reasoning in the framing of the issues put to
citizens in their elections.
The question then arises, what are the things people want from
political institutions more generally when they invoke impartial rea-
soning?  Obviously the social stability so prized by Hobbes is high on
the list.  Any examination of the African and Asiatic tragedies on the
front pages of the daily newspapers give evidence to that.  But beyond
socio-economic stability, the question is whether there are common
elements that people want from their social arrangements.
Experiments to examine the nature of justice from a Rawlsian
perspective83 have led us to observe a number of surprising uniformi-
ties.  Subjects in groups of five were told that they would be doing
some work, and would be paid on the basis of their productivity.  They
did not know what sort of work and could not, therefore, know their
productivity relative to other group members.  The subjects in numer-
ous replications around the world were always willing to work toward a
social contract, even if it took a substantial length of time to reach
agreement.  In other words, from behind an experimental “veil of ig-
norance,” individuals everywhere want to have a social contract.  Fur-
ther, they were able to reach one unanimously.  In virtually all cases,
the form of the contract remains the same: they want a welfare floor
to take care of needs, room for incentives to reward effort so as to
ensure just desserts and efficiency.
So there is a lot of agreement among people about a notion of
justice, enough to support, at least provisionally, the hypothesis that
there is a universal human consensus on one particular form of dis-
tributive justice: a social safety net or floor.  This conjecture is the jus-
tificatory basis for choosing lexically satiable basic needs as a measure
of social welfare.  It provides a metric for democratic performance
among relatively stable developed democracies: the stability, quality,
and porosity of the social safety net.
83. See RAWLS, supra note 2 and accompanying text. R
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B. Differences in Performance
TABLE 2: GROWTH IN INCOME - POST TAX/TRANSFER 1984-95
PER CAP INCOME GROWTH
Germany 17%
Holland 18%
USA 16%
MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME GROWTH
Germany 14%
Holland 16%
USA 1%
Of course, markets rather than politics may be harnessed to sup-
ply much in the way of insurance.  And there may be tradeoffs that
must be considered: the moral hazards created by a safety net can
conflict with economic performance.  Increasing support for the poor
could just decrease productivity.
Of course, one might wonder if, empirically, social welfare spend-
ing decreases productivity.  Consider the work of Goodin et al., who
looked at a long panel study (circa 1984–1994) having to do with vari-
ous aspects of the political economy of Germany, Holland, and the
United States.84  Specifically examining the fate of the poor and the
performance of the economy, they discovered that the United States’
lack of social welfare spending meant that similarly performing econo-
mies produced very different results for the average citizen (see Table
2).85
84. See GOODIN ET AL., supra note 72, at 98–119 (describing the long panel study of the R
United States, the Netherlands, and Germany).
85. Id. at 60–62.
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FIGURE 1: OECD RELATION BETWEEN POVERTY RATES AND SOCIAL WEL-
FARE SPENDING ON WORKING AGED POPULATION (EXCLUDING HEALTH
CARE)
The literature on this is interesting.  One test of the political effi-
cacy of social welfare policy might be the poverty rate as a correlate of
social welfare spending.  But if the poverty were mainly among the
working poor and the social welfare spending were mainly in the form
of old age payments, then there would be a mismatch of types and
social welfare spending would not affect poverty.  But the findings of
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), using a definition of poverty as fifty percent of the median
income, is that among the OECD members there is a very high corre-
lation (r = .824) between spending on social welfare programs for
working-aged people (excluding health) and ending poverty (see Fig-
ure 1).86
Although these measures are not fully thought out for our pur-
poses; they are suggestive, and indicate that considerable differences
in performance, using our conception of social welfare, exist between
developed democracies.
86. Michael Fo¨rster & Marco Mira d’Ercole, Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD
Countries in the Second Half of the 1990s, at 28 (OECD Social Employment and Migration
Working Paper No. 22, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=671783.
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III. EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES WITH POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND
SOCIAL CONSTRAINTS
Fully explaining the differences is left for another day, but here
we sketch the argument that it is mainly the checks and balances
against democracy that protect undesirable (in terms of the considera-
tion of individual needs) status quo policies and thus prevent some
democratic systems from delivering better policies (i.e., those that
could ensure higher welfare) to their citizenry.87
By thwarting majority decisions via institutionally structured veto
points inhibiting many decisions to change the status quo, the United
States Constitution has in fact generated a government with less
responsiveness.88
Preferences alone when tied to problems of distribution are not
likely to generate equilibria in majority-rule contexts.  And even when
they do, some institutional factors may well alter the outcomes.  Dis-
cussing this, we necessarily break up the analysis of the factors as if
they each exist independently, but this is preposterous.  Rather, infor-
mal arrangements are encouraged, generated, and otherwise affected
by the formal structures of the political system.  So after discussing the
elements singly we will attempt to try to round out the discussion by
considering the interaction of the variables discussed.  To begin, let us
consider some contextual variables that exhibit considerable variance
across the developed democracies and sketch their likely effects.  We
begin with the most obvious: turnout, and who is empowered to vote.
A. Turnout and Suffrage
It is easy to develop a sense of the importance of turnout in our
models.  Everywhere, the behavior of actually going to the polls to
vote is a function of income.  If the granting of voting rights is related
to having an address, for example, then the homeless (obviously
mainly very poor individuals) will not be able to vote.  If criminal con-
victions are a function of income (they are), and if restrictions on
voting are imposed for criminal behavior, then, again, the poor will be
less able to vote.
Assume, as we have, that the interests in social welfare are also a
function of income, and it is clear that turnout differentials that are
87. See TSEBELIS, supra note 16, at 2 (noting that the status quo is often preserved via R
the elaborate structure of veto points in democratic systems).
88. See Ronald Rogowski, Institutions as Constraints on Strategic Choice, in STRATEGIC
CHOICE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 115, 129, 132 (David A. Lake & Robert Powell eds.,
1999) (noting that checks and balances often “impede mobilization” on policy decisions).
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correlated with income could affect the outcomes of otherwise identi-
cal political processes.  In the simplest case, imagine that a dispropor-
tionate fraction of the persons who do not vote lean further left than
most of the others do.  This will shift the outcome (or the median
voter) to the right.
Turnout and its correlation with income varies greatly across the
developed democracies.  We conjecture the outcomes regarding dis-
tributive matters across income classes will reflect who votes, and dif-
ferences in who votes will be reflected in differences in whose interests
are satisfied.  A political system that allows states to effectively disen-
franchise citizens and artificially keep polls unpopulated leads to sys-
tematic protection of status quo policies that favor the wealthy, and
prevents the policies that could satisfy the basic needs of citizens.
B. Financing Politics
Our image of politicians in democracies is that of self-interested
individuals who aspire to reelection.  This helps us understand their
interest in responding to voters’ requests.  But satisfying voters’ de-
mands is not the only factor needed to win elections.  Voters are noto-
riously uninformed about the actual state of public policy and the role
of the particular politician in it.89  This leads to the need for publicity,
advertising, and, hence, media access.  We can think then, from the
politician’s point of view, there is a “production process” for votes:
money, policies, and favors are factors of production.
There are enormous differences in the financial arrangements re-
garding media access and other aspects of electioneering among de-
mocracies.  In some places, parties that are sufficiently “popular” or
“supported” in the previous electoral cycle are often “certified” and
must be given free or subsidized air time.  This formula has considera-
ble latitude in application.  How much air time, at what cost, to whom,
where, etc. all vary considerably.  How much parties can spend on
elections beyond that which they are “given” is also variable, as is
where the money can come from.
Of course, money, like votes, is given to support policies and can-
didates one wants to win.  When some corporate donors appear to
give to both sides, it is not just out of altruistic interest in supporting
the electoral system.  Such behavior is correlated with policy or regula-
tory interests and support and, therefore, does not come free in terms
of policy outcomes.
89. Indeed, this is a sufficiently important topic that we treat it more fully below.
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In some countries the government has a major presence in the
media and news markets.  For example, we can think of few developed
democracies that have a less well-established national broadcasting sys-
tem than the U.S.  These national media corporations are often re-
quired to participate quite heavily in the information dispersion
process during election times, in giving free broadcast space for de-
bates, etc.  Without such subsidies, campaigning is expensive.  And
more costly elections, financed at the private trough, lead to wealthier
corporate interests being more heavily weighted in the political
processes.  Similar to turnout constraints, financial constraints over-
weight the wealthier voters and their interests at the cost of meeting
the basic needs of the citizenry.90
C. Political Institutions and Equilibria Using Majority Rule
We can also sketch the relation between outcomes, equilibria,
and institutional details.  The lesson is that one cannot understand
the outcome of a democratic process as a simple aggregation of the
preferences or choices of the individuals involved, independent of the
details of the aggregating, or decision-making, institutions.  When
there is a lack of equilibrium, political institutions may generate one,
and were there an equilibrium, the details of the institutions could
prevent that equilibrium from being attained.  To illustrate, consider
examples of how the detailed institutional elements help determine
the outcomes of democratic choice in matters that affect social wel-
fare.  Perhaps no one factor is surprising, but together we expect they
can be shown to account for much of the great differences in social
welfare delivered by the different democratic systems in the economi-
cally developed world.
1. Formal Properties of the Institutions: Veto Points, Pivots, and
Equilibria
Political institutions do not grow by themselves.  They are gener-
ated by politicians in order to aid them in going about their jobs and
getting reelected.  Of course, the institutions often have a life that ex-
tends beyond their original purpose, but it is useful to think of how
the institutions empower the politicians.
90. Considerable analytic work has been done on this. See generally MUELLER, supra
note 23. R
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FIGURE 2: THE FILIBUSTER RULE EMPOWERING 40% TO PREVENT THE END
OF DEBATE ON A BILL.
Consider the example of a particular institution, such as a rule to
end debate in a legislature.  We note how such rules create veto points
and pivotal voters.  Specifically, consider the rule in the U.S. Senate
that enables filibusters.  The rule stipulates that sixty percent of the
members have to agree to end debate.  Hence, a disgruntled forty per-
cent can prevent voting on a proposal on the floor of the Senate.
Preventing a vote prevents the status quo from being changed.  Con-
sider then how the institution works.  Assume, for simplicity, that the
issue is one dimensional and to be decided by majority vote.  Then the
median voter’s position (m in Figure 2) is the majority-rule equilib-
rium and expected outcome.  But the fortieth (and sixtieth) percen-
tile voting members of the legislature are able to prevent the debate
from stopping; they can veto the consideration of the legislation to
move the status quo.  There are two cases to consider, defined by the
position of the status quo relative to the position of the fortieth per-
centile and sixtieth percentile voters along the line (see Figure 2).
The first case has the status quo (Q*) between these two mem-
bers’ ideal points (L, R) (Q* in the figure).  In this case, moving the
status quo from a position already between the two “veto players.”
Note that no movement is possible toward m.  For if someone pro-
posed legislation that moved from Q* to the right, the left forty per-
cent of the members would constitute a filibuster bloc and could be
counted on blocking the move.  And a similar outcome would exist if
Q* were to the right of m.
On the other hand, the status quo could be at Q+, beyond the
space defined by the distance between the ideal points of the veto
players: L and R.  To beat Q+ a proposal, P+, would have to be crafted
so that less than forty percent on the left block would be against the
proposal.  Assuming that L cares equally about the distance to his
ideal point on either side, then to garner his support, the proposal
would have to be closer to L than Q+.  After all, he would only vote for
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a proposal that was closer than P+ to L.  In other words, the focus
would be completely on fashioning proposals to attract L (or R); these
are the “pivotal voters,” or “play makers.”  People with interests about
legislation will pay special attention to such play makers, and we ex-
pect that financial benefactors will as well.
An institutional structure that creates many veto players ensures
that legislation will be relatively costly to enact, and that the outcome
will not be particularly responsive to the median voter’s interests and
positions.  A further point can be made: there is a parallel between
electrical circuits and political institutions in that we can consider in-
stitutions that are in parallel and those that are in series. If one can
get something done in a number of ways, the paths are parallel.  We
would expect that costs are contained by such arrangements.  On the
other hand, when the action requires a particular route to enactment,
then all the gate keepers (now in series) need to be dealt with.91  Of
course, all real world processes are a mix of these things.  Presidents
can enact policy by “decree” but it does not have the same force, nor
the same status or difficulty being changed as a law.
2. Parties, Disciplined Voting
In most parliaments where the survival of the executive depends
upon the glue of a legislative majority coalition, political parties are
able to demand strict loyalty for voting on the issues that come before
parliament.  And voting regarding governmental matters is deter-
mined in the “cabinet” of the prime minister.  In keeping with the
emphasis above on veto points and pivotal players, it becomes clear
that the existence of disciplined parliamentary parties restricts the po-
tential for a proliferation of independent “play makers.”  These more
specialized fiefdoms do not show up as a separate check or balance
that can thwart the will of the majority.
IV. OTHER ASPECTS OF THE ENVIRONMENT
The above discussion focused on what we quite narrowly mean by
“political” processes and political institutions.  But there are at least
four other, less immediately political, aspects of democratic societies
that we believe impact strongly the translation of political processes
on social welfare.  We touch on each below.
91. See Avinash Dixit, Some Lessons from Transaction-Cost Politics for Less-Developed Coun-
tries, 15 ECON. & POL. 107 (2003) (outlining the differing constraints and considerations
relevant to creation of successful policy in different developing countries).
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A. A Sense of Justice
Elsewhere we have shown that even a partially shared sense of
distributional justice can equilibrate a political trajectory so that the
long-term end state regarding the distribution of welfare will conform
to the shared conception of justice, and not lead to the expected vot-
ing or social choice cycles over distributional matters.92  The variable
that determines the likelihood of cycles over distributional matters is
the capacity of the political process and leaders to frame those matters
in a moral light, causing citizens to think of them through an impar-
tial lens.
Again, the more disciplined the parties and the fewer the inde-
pendent play makers, the easier it will be to frame political issues co-
herently.  The existence of many independent political veto points
will mean that there will be a sharing of political power; checks and
balances will disperse the message makers and, hence, the framing of
political issues will be more a function of other interests rather than
deliberate political strategy of teams of vote-getters.
B. Mobility of Capital
The ability to tax progressively is limited by the ability of individu-
als to move their income and wealth to jurisdictions to avoid taxa-
tion.93  Insofar as the larger social insurance programs must be
financed by taxes, and, if the benefits are to go to the poorest, part of
the support of these programs must come from redistributional as-
pects of the taxes.  Thus, the redistributional possibilities are limited
by the mobility of capital and income.
C. Information
If public goods are defined as those goods distributed to a group
of individuals, the outcomes of most political (as opposed to per-
sonal) decisions can be classified as public goods.  We can draw impli-
cations from collective action analysis regarding how people will
inform themselves about political decisions, such as voting.  Informa-
tion and information processing is costly.  Consider Iris, a newspaper
reader.  She notices the variety of things to read and chooses within
the constraints that she has (perhaps only one half hour available at
breakfast).  She spends twenty or more minutes on page one and then
92. See generally Justice, Preferences and the Arrow Problem, supra note 16. R
93. See CARLES BOIX, DEMOCRACY AND REDISTRIBUTION (2003) (noting that one can pre-
dict social peace and democracy by modeling the mobility of capital as a “set the tax rate”
game).
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she skims; the headlines suggest to her many items of interest.  On
page four she sees something that looks negative and important con-
cerning a candidate she was going to vote for in the next election, and
a story on pollution at the beach she was planning to go to for vaca-
tion.  Of course she is torn, wants to read both, but has only a few
minutes.  How to decide?
Let’s consider why Iris is so likely to read about the beach and not
the candidate.  Getting information about the candidate can lead her
to avoid the error of voting for the wrong candidate, someone she
would rather not see win.  Getting information about the beach can
lead her to avoid the error of going to the wrong beach, someplace
she would rather not swim.  If it is an important office, the election
could have a bigger impact (higher taxes, loss of programs that matter
to her, perhaps a war, etc.) than a somewhat less nice vacation, but,
gathering all the information in the world about the candidate is not
likely to do more than prevent her from making a mistake in her vot-
ing.  It is very unlikely to change the outcome of the election. Getting
information about a polluted beach can allow her to avoid a ruined
vacation with certainty.
Similar to the logic of collective action, the rational voter decides
not to invest in the information about the public good, not so clearly
because of self-interest, but because of lack of efficacy.94  The argu-
ment leads to a law-like statement: in general, individuals have a radi-
cally discounted interest in acquiring information about political
affairs.  Citizens will, in general, remain rationally ignorant.95
This has implications for the performance of democracies.  To
remain informed there has to be a “cheap” stream of information for
the voters.  For example, in the fall of 2005, all the citizens of New
Orleans and the Gulf Coast region of the United States directly ob-
served the effects of Hurricane Katrina.  Many of them also directly
94. See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 258 (1957) (noting that
many rational voters do not put any resources into acquiring political information because
“the returns are so low”).  Reviewing one experimental design is revealing, running it in a
class is eye opening.  John Pisciotta, an economist at Baylor University, designed a simple
in-class experiment about rational ignorance that is also a learning exercise for the partici-
pants.  They are given a budget to spend on gathering information about a private
purchase and a voting in a referendum decision.  The values are similar for the outcomes
in the two classes, and the students can choose what information to invest in.  Round one
leads to a split investment pattern.  But quickly the pattern of investment in information
shifts to the private decision as the students become aware that there is less to be gained in
gathering information on what to vote for than what to buy. John Pisciotta, Information for
Market and Voting Choices: A Rational Voter Ignorance Experiment (working paper), available at
http://business.baylor.edu/John_Pisciotta/.
95. DOWNS, supra note 94, at 259.
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experienced or were neighbors of those who experienced the failures
of the response of the government in giving aid.  In Louisiana, citizens
knew first-hand that the levees gave way, that rescue efforts were dis-
mal, that the poor were virtually left to die, and that FEMA failed in
delivering help.  Voters who felt that they too may have been aban-
doned need not have more information than that to know they
wanted the government to be changed.96  But not all information
need be gathered in such a casual manner.
Wealth is invariably linked to significant private interests and
greater incentives (and means) to acquire political news, not to men-
tion the greater means to use the information to affect political out-
comes.  Thus, the wealthy will be far more politically informed than
the poor.  Without mass organizations such as unions or class-based
parties, the poor generally will not correctly identify their political in-
terests, but the wealthy may.
D. Private Property Rights
There is, perhaps, an interesting relationship to be seen between
private property rights and the British common law tradition.  For in
common law societies (e.g., all former British colonies), what becomes
law is a function of how particular legal precedents can be used to
shed light on current cases.  This means that the legal code is changed
not one decision at a time, but on an accrual basis by courtroom deci-
sions.  In such a system, the decisions regarding one private property
right, perhaps originally argued for only one form of property, can
gradually be extended to other forms of property.  Similarly, behav-
iors can be protected far beyond what was originally conceived as be-
ing covered.
For example, the free speech protections in the U.S. Bill of Rights
were extended to cover corporate speech (i.e., advertising, etc.) in a
manner totally unlikely to be consistent with the Framers’ conception
of the meaning of freedom of speech.  The same path led to a strong
protection for an equal role for corporate money in electoral politics,
even though by doing this the free speech was being given neither to
voters nor to associations of voters.  Rather, the right to buy commer-
cial political messages was being given to corporations.
96. Indeed, I should note the empirical finding of Amartya Sen that famines have
never happened in a democracy. See generally AMARTYA K. SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN
ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT AND DEPRAVATION (1981).  Amartya K. Sen’s theoretical discussion
of this in Famines and Other Crises, supra note 20, is in the spirit of this Essay. R
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And although the property rights that slave-holders had in their
slaves were terminated by the Civil War and the constitutional changes
thereafter, such a cautionary tale may miss the point.  Because slavery
was contentious, and many cases were brought to court, many nuances
regarding property rights were developed in the United States.  The
many protections built up by common law decisions securing the
rights of property owners to slaves were extended to other forms of
property, and served to extend the conception of private property
rights in the United States.
V. CONCLUSIONS: PULLING TOGETHER INSTITUTIONS, OUTCOMES,
VALUES AND PROPOSALS
How do the factors we have discussed come together to affect our
ability to judge proposals to change the rules of the political game, or
constitutional rules?
At the deepest level, we are saying that constitutional proposals
should be evaluated in terms of a measuring rod of basic objectives.
Without a careful assessment of objectives, there is no solid founda-
tion for evaluating proposals.
Additionally, we argue that in a democracy the measuring rod of
concern should be related directly to the welfare of the citizenry, or,
social welfare.  However, any such notion of social welfare has difficul-
ties in getting leverage unless one can establish an element that is
interpersonally comparable.  Here, we argue that the element is the
satisfaction of the basic needs of citizens.
If this is accepted, then constitutional proposals must be justified
by their facilitation of the goals of democracy, which is to be under-
stood as more than a mechanical working through of a voting process.
Reforms should be targeting those aspects of the system that unduly
privilege those status quo points that leave the needy with impossible
and debilitating burdens, and hamper, rather than improve, our liber-
ties and freedoms.  In the main, unfortunately, such reforms in the
United States may need to strike at the heart of the many checks and
balances that were deliberately put in place to hem in democracy by
our founding elites.
